'Contained' representation of individuals in Multilateral Democracy: How to represent individuals in Multilateral Democracy while avoiding supranational domination

Representation in the European Union is complex since it involves several delegation mechanisms and institutions. All the more, the question of whether it fulfils democratic criteria needs to be discussed. The aim of this paper is two-fold, firstly it develops institutional design implications for the representation of peoples and individuals and secondly assesses the existing institutions of the EU on this basis in order to suggest reform options. Starting from the theory of multilateral democracy I argue that unlike intergovernmental institutions the EU requires an additional and independent legislative chamber in which individuals are directly represented. In general, one would expect such a chamber to realise the equality of individuals in multilateral democracy. However, strict equality cannot be the guiding principle for this chamber. In order to avoid domination of peoples through supranational majorities, it is necessary to bind the chamber’s composition by some kind of principle of digressive proportionality. This paper discusses how exactly individuals should be represented in multilateral democracy, while avoiding supranational domination. As multilateral democracy has at its heart not just intergovernmental and supranational representation but also transnational opening, the paper explores various means that may serve for the representatives to transcend their national identities through transnational engagement.