In this paper, situating the Turkish failed coup attempt with hundreds of similar instances since the end of the Second World all over the world, I explain that one obvious reason for coups to fail is poor planning and execution. The chances for a coup to fail increase if it is staged mostly by middle ranking officers and if these officers cannot signal to their comrades that they will be successful. This was what happened in the Turkish case. However a thorough study should also take into account the context in which the coup took place. Following Samuel Finer’s disposition and opportunity model, I argue that the disposition to intervene in Turkey has not changed much over the years, but the opportunity structure has closed since 2007. Political elites (including the opposition parties), the top brass of the military, and public opinion have decisively condemned the military’s involvement in politics. This is partially why if the coup had succeeded it would have resulted in a bloody and repressive regime. However, the fact that there was no opportunity was quite well known and it was obvious that the coup would have failed or triggered a civil war. Then why did the coup plotters risk the attempt? I conclude that the only reasonable explanation we have at the moment is that the leading putschists were desperate because they were going to be dismissed from the military for being Gülenists.
