Moral/Political Psychology, Dual-Processing, and Democratic Virtues: Implications for Political Philosophy

How should political philosophers engage the findings of moral/political psychology? This paper proposes an active form that is reciprocal, and I employ the notion of democratic virtues in relation to psychological theories of dual-processing to make this point. The notion of civic virtue has a long history, originating in ancient Greek thought and carried forward by the republican tradition in Italy, England, and the United States. It was revived briefly in the context of the communitarian debates of the 1990s, but attention has subsequently receded. Despite this, vigorous debate concerning virtue theories has continued in moral philosophy, and there has been active engagement with psychologists on this issue. Contemporary dual-processing models in psychology have proved to be both a resource and source of criticism for virtue theories. The dual process models of moral/political cognition of Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene create problems for standard models of virtue, but the models of Darcia Narvaez and Keith Stanovich offer more interesting possibilities. I argue that it is important for political philosophers to not only treat models of moral/political psychology as data that serve to (dis)confirm certain positions, but that they should also be actively engaged in analysis, critique and formation of models within psychology. I further argue that political philosophers can serve an important bridging function, connecting the “micro” level analysis of psychology to the “macro” level analysis of political science. Thus, understanding the virtues as “democratic virtues,” forming and formed by political and cultural institutions, can jointly improve theorizing across disciplines.