Promotion to Higher Courts and Court Presidency in the Slovak Judiciary

Slovak judiciary enjoys a high level of autonomy in the administration of its own matters. Promotion of judges to court presidency was an exception until 2011 when open, competitive and transparent selection procedures for these positions were introduced. Promotion to higher courts has been in the hands of judiciary even before, but 2011 reform changed the rules as well. These reforms were believed to ensure requirements of many international documents which posited that transferring powers regarding professional careers of judges would ensure that decisions will be based on merit, as opposed to political preferences of actors involved in the process. In line with the literature on legal transplants, the particular context of Slovak judiciary proved to be at times much unfit for increased autonomy. I contend that post-communist judiciaries tend to display a variety of bureaucratic and corporatist features. First of all, ordinary judiciaries – just like other bureaucratic agencies – are designed to serve particular tasks in the society (e.g. Shapiro 1981, Bobek 2008, Uzelac 2010). They are the only institution empowered to provide a specific type of public goods – adjudication, which puts them in the position of ‘bureaucratic monopolies’ (e.g. Johnson 1997). Such institutions often seek satisfaction of their own needs predominantly; they decrease the efficiency of accountability mechanisms while securing their jobs and existence – protecting the status quo with regard to attitudes and practices. I argue that social and cultural capital – hence candidates’ personal networks and attitudes and practices acquired through socialization, can serve as vehicles for these tendencies. For the analysis I use data from 2012 – 2015 for all promotions in the Slovak judiciary using information found in candidates’ CVs. Data will be analyzed using conditional logit method with a focus on characteristics which increase candidates’ chances for being promoted. Preliminary analysis suggests promoted judges are pre-selected before the selection procedure actually takes place, however causes and possible consequences of this practice remain unclear.