From Non-governmental to Neo-governmental Organizations exploring the Impact of Donors’ Strategies on Humanitarian NGOs

Since the last decade, several indicators attest to the essential role played by non-governmental organizations in international politics. Their role is multifaceted and very diverse: they set the agenda, define policy options, implement a wide array of very technical programs and growingly control how State respect their commitment on the global scene. Against this backdrop, the humanitarian sector appears as one of the policy field where the involvement of NGOs is the greatest. In 2013, 4278 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) managed an amount of USD 10,7 billion dedicated to humanitarian response to crises. Out of this number, 783 enjoy a unique capacity to intervene worldwide to handle major humanitarian crises. This central role of NGO can be explained by the unique nature of humanitarianism within the foreign policy arsenal. The contemporary humanitarian system is governed by the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which posits that humanitarian aid is to be implemented by impartial and neutral actors. Yet, since the end of the Cold War, States have been involved in the financing of NGO’s humanitarian interventions in war-torn societies at an unprecedented level. This financial commitment has soon led to a growing decision-making power of governmental actors, both at the bilateral and multilateral level, through the development of humanitarian strategies by global powers. This paper aims to assess the impact of such a commitment on the humanitarian NGOs. We argue that this involvement of governmental actors results from a strategy of control of humanitarian NGOs. Through their funding, States aim to use humanitarian NGOs to further their strategic agenda in war-torn societies. Drawing upon contract theory and the combined analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, we explore the impact of States intervention on the level of independence of NGOs. Our results show States’ funding mostly benefit to NGO that are financially and politically dependent to their home States. NGO thus become neo-governmental organizations. These agencies experience a greater rate of rejection of their action in conflict zones than NGOs that refuse to rely on public funding. Faced with increased operational challenges, both types of NGOs develop adverse strategies: neo-governmental organizations call for a greater involvement of States in the protection of humanitarian actor, whereas independent NGOs calls for safeguarding the apolitical character of the field. These contrasted reactions profoundly modify the power play characterizing the humanitarian system.