'Non-partisan Presidents' and 'Independent Presidencies' in Independent Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste emerged into independence under the leadership of a charismatic figure who played his role outside any political party, and was elected by a landslide to be the country’s first president. This set the tone for the subsequent elections, and two other “independent” (i.e., non-partisan) candidates were elected in 2007 and 2012. The Timorese constitution defines a role for presidents, elected by direct popular suffrage, which is distinct from the realm of executive power, reserved for the prime-minister and his government who are responsible before a parliament also directly elected. Also, it contains several prescriptions that converge on the notion that presidents are not supposed to directly interfere with parliamentary party politics, their role being distinct from leading either the parliamentary majority or the minority (“co-habitation”), in line with Duverger’s suggestion of “presidents without majority”. In this sense, more than the individual characteristics of candidates, the diarchy thus established – which to a large extent mirrors forms of dual power extant in Timorese historically rooted perceptions of legitimacy – carves a status for presidencies as independent bodies with their own realm of power not reducible to mere ceremonial or institutional functions. In a context of a young democracy struggling to root its institutions and social actors and where public opinion was not hegemonized by political parties, the combination of non-partisan candidates with a definition of presidencies as “independent” or neutral (in the sense of Benjamin Constant’s “pouvoir moderateur”) played an important role. As Lijphart suggested, the constitutional design for divided societies should emphasize power-sharing institutions in order to underline the need for inclusiveness. In past writings, I have explored this argument and stressed its positive contribution to the rooting of democracy and a modicum of stability in the country. Non-partisan presidents and independent presidencies entered a virtuous circle which offered increased opportunities for political participation for actors outside the very fragile parliament (Shoesmith), and enhanced the scope of horizontal accountability. After three different presidential experiences, and when a turn is expected at the next election, a comprehensive look should be cast over this fifteen year period. In this exercise, one cannot fail to notice the development of what has been mentioned to me in Dili as the “Syndrome of the Wrong Palace”. Two of the country’s presidents stepped down from their post and formed political parties to run in parliamentary elections. Xanana Gusmão made a successful bid at becoming prime-minister (2007-2015), while Taur Matan Ruak is still going through the same process (although with much reduced chances of success). The proposed paper will explore the two sides of the coin: the positive contribution the adopted solution has provided to the challenges of rooting a young democracy in a post-conflict setting, and its shortcomings, namely the impact on political competition and institutional stability.