Policy Noncompliance and Policy Change – The Case of Local Government Amalgamation

This paper studies local government amalgamation reform in Norway in order to analyse policy noncompliance by policy targets, together with the government’s response to noncompliance (Gofen, 2015). By focusing noncompliance as a strategy to avoid or change a policy, we study target resistance and government reactions as an interactive process characterized by policy dissonance (ibid.), where noncompliance may influence policy change over time. Gofen distinguishes between enforcement, accept, adaptation and embracement as government responses to reconcile policy dissonance. I deploy her conceptual framework to analyse a different kind of policy targets – local governments, and a complex reform policy where a number of governance tools are in use. Overall, noncompliance in the amalgamation reform is high. Of 428 local governments, only 88 had voluntarily decided to merger into 36 new LG’s (December 2016). 55 additional LG`s want to merge, but have not found willing partners. Regarding types of noncompliance, we find both rejection of specific reform elements and broader, value based voices. Main examples of the first type is noncompliance because local actors do not see a need for policy change, together with fear of losing nearness to LG services and institutions. Value based noncompliance is found where local actors maintain that amalgamation will reduce local democracy, and where they resist the reform because it is viewed as an element in a broader centralization strategy from the government. Many local actors also question the decision rules designed by the national authorities. When classifying policy elements and responses I use the NATO typology (Hood & Margetts, 2007) of policy tools in combination with Gofen’s response typology. Regarding nodality, initial policy established clear criteria for municipal size. Later responses modified the ambitions, pointing towards greater acceptance of noncompliance. Regarding treasure, there is a development from incentives to sanctions, pointing towards enforcement. There is mandatory local negotiations and an organisational setup for process advice from county governors. The advisory process varies, from embracement to enforcement. The parliament will make authoritative decisions on amalgamation in the spring 2017. Hence, the final policy response is not known yet. The main conclusion is that government responses to policy dissonance are not consistent so far. The government has to handle different target groups who do not give the same reasons for noncompliance, and this make it difficult to establish consistent responses. Another obstacle is that constitutive policies and decision rules were not clear from the beginning of the process, so policy makers have to manage noncompliance to the rules of the game and to the substantive policies simultaneously.