A Theory of Order

Political realists believe that there is an inner normativity within the political sphere, and that theories which draw normativity from outside of are to be rejected. This paper tackles the related questions of what politics is, why we have it and what is required by its logic. The issue of the nature of politics have recently seen a resurgence of interest, particularly within the realistic framework. Here I shall claim that the main function of politics is to issue final collective decisions under conditions of widespread disagreement about them. The main difference between morality and politics, in this outlook, is that we are naturally equipped to deal with our own conflicting views about what to do. Even when we are pulled in different directions this rarely impede our ability to act one way or the other. On the contrary, on a collective level, when these differences pull us apart there is no natural system to ensure that a common decision is selected and followed through. This is the task of politics. We have reasons to do what is required by politics, only if politics itself is in some sense required. Going back to the roots of political philosophy, I return to the classical observation that politics is an exclusively human activity. Other animals are either self-sufficient (like foxes) or have unbreakable ‘social’ control (like bees). Men, on the contrary, first are free to pursue whatever preferences they may have, even at the expense of other men. Secondly, men need other men to provide for themselves. In this sense politics seems a necessary condition for individual survival. This point acquires the gravity, which realists attribute to it, when linked with the circumstances of time and space. Men happen to find themselves living near other men, and this creates the need for common decisions regarding how to reduce negative externalities. Moreover, the urgency of political questions creates the need for a system that quickly resolve disagreement over what to do, as hesitation may carry dire consequences. This argument, which positively reframes a common critique to ideal deliberation, constitutes a promising ground to explain why we have politics as a practice, and why the securing of order and cooperation is thus the true ‘first virtue of social institutions’. If politics is about issuing collective decisions under conditions of disagreement about them, and if politics is necessary for our survival, then maintaining a cooperative social order is the basic function, and thus the most desirable feature, of political institutions. While there are other important normative considerations at play when we adjudicate the desirability of different systems, it is important to keep in mind that their ability to issue collective decisions is an essential condition of their being political systems, which is something we need. Also, order so conceived does not necessarily lead to a complacent, status-quo biased outlook, but it may require even drastic change to be maintained.