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Cultivating a Deliberative Stance

Democracy
Political Participation
Political Psychology
Communication
Experimental Design
Policy Change
Public Opinion
Julia Jennstål
Uppsala Universitet
Julia Jennstål
Uppsala Universitet
Simon Niemeyer
Faculty of Business, Government and Law, University of Canberra

Abstract

There has been much focus in deliberative democracy on procedures that may be more or less deliberative, which may also bear some relationship to the deliberativeness of an outcome or decision. More recently the idea of dispositional state has gained attention, initially through the idea of ‘deliberative stance’ proposed by Owen and Smith. The idea of a deliberative stance potentially fills important gaps in the theory of deliberation, where differences in stance confound the relationship between procedure and outcome. If it can be said that an individual as adopted a more deliberative stance during a deliberative encounter, then we might expect difference in outcome compared to another who has not, even though all other procedural observations may be the same — although it is also likely that stance and procedure are also related. The role of inducing a deliberative stance was tested as part of a mini public field experiment in 2016 in Sweden on the issue of begging by internal EU migrants. Two groups participated in a three-day process, one of which undertook pre-deliberative group exercises aimed at inducing deliberative norms, or a ‘deliberative stance’. The second group did not undertake any group exercises, but instead began the process with a briefing about the ideals of deliberation. Both groups then participated in the same process. The differences in outcome between the two groups were analysed in terms of conventional preference transformation, as well as the intersubjective relationship between values, beliefs — or ‘reasons’ — and policy choices (intersubjective consistency). The implications of the results for deliberative theory and practice are discussed.