From Protest to (local) Government. Between Institutionalisation and Populism: The Case of the Italian M5S

Populism often manifests itself as a protest answer towards current political institutions. In the same context, populist organisations struggle to establish themselves. According to Mény and Surel (2000; 2001) populism often advantages itself with its overpromising purposes. So, when it arrived to take the power “or it maintains its promises and it is consequentially bound to a failure or it reviews its electoral intents in the hope that its voters will have a short memories”. In fact, populism, when it is able to undermine the old elites, in the name of a certain popular sovereignty, it is quickly obligated to legitimate the expertise and the professional ability, risking a swift failure or a compromise-collusion with the mainstream politicians. The paper focuses on the evolution of the Italian Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle – M5S) as a case of populist party able to start its process of institutionalisation. It was born in 2009 as a local and civic list and it represents a new example of populism characterized by unprecedented traits (Lanzone 2014; 2015; 2016). In 2010 the M5S obtained its first seats during regional elections and in 2012 it achieved its first Major in a big town (Parma). This path from the “people” to the political institutions has been completed between 2013 and 2014 with entry into National and European Parliament. The same process caused a lot of changes in party strategies and a strong debate inside the party in regards to its organisation (structure). In particular, are the relationships between leadership, membership and public office causing ruptures and division at national and/or at sub-national level causing also some changes in statute and internal rules. The analysis moves from a qualitative and quantitative interviews (2015-2017) and proposes a comparison between the original project launched by the party leader (Beppe Grillo) in 2009 and the current party political agenda. Local cases will work as examples of “overpromising populism” accused by the central office of a compromise-collusion with the “old” power. An analysis of national and sub-national organisation (parliamentary party) will serve as a verification of the idea that “power participation” leads to “moderation” of populists (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2014). In conclusion, the paper will hazard some hypothesis about the future of the party and its possible “government role” in a more general perspective.