Feasibility Constraints to Institutional Engineering?

Normative political theorists have long been occupied with questions how to best design democratic institutions. Most elaborated recommendations however remain incommensurable. While proponents of liberal approaches seek the creation of multiple institutional veto points and super-majoritarian voting procedures, more egalitarian approaches favour majoritarian procedures. Empirical studies regarding the effects of different types of democracy on democratic performance however remain inconclusive and limit the usefulness of these recommendations as master plans in the creation of democratic institutions. Does this however imply that we should refrain from institutional engineering; how can we learn about the potentials and limitations of institutional engineering; and how can such knowledge inform and advance normative political theory? While this paper does not seek ultimate answers to these undoubtedly relevant questions, it assesses current limitations and future potentials in identifying feasibility constraints to institutional engineering and critically discusses potential implications for normative political theory. Considering the role of research designs in the identification of a potentially most realistic theory containing implications on feasibility constraints to institutional engineering, it meets the goals of the panel “Political Theory: Utopian or Realistic“. The paper is structured as followed: Since the current state of research lacks empirical support to discriminate between better or worse of the incommensurable design proposals proposed in the introduction, the paper points to the relevance of principal agent theory and accountability mechanisms to those interested in the potentials and limitations of institutional engineering. Therefore, it introduces principal agent theory to reflect how rational choice institutionalists conceive of democratic institutions as consciously designed accountability mechanisms. Moreover, it presents accountability mechanisms proposed in the current state of research and how they structure the incentives and constraints of political actors according to principal agent theorists. A subsequent critical discussion of principal agent theory from various new institutionalist perspectives shows useful to assess how various institutionalisms conceive of accountability and abilities to consciously design accountability mechanisms. Doing so, awareness of the deep ontological divide some new institutionalists associate with the perceived incommensurability between sociological and rational choice institutionalism are raised and more recent proposals from discursive and historical institutionalists presented. Instead of arguing in favour of one superior new institutionalism, it is however suggested to constructively employ the theoretical pluralism so often confusing students of political science in order to advance our knowledge on the feasibility constraints to institutional engineering in the most fruitful manner. To identify a (potentially) most realistic among rival theories, the paper builds on recent proposals to add contrastive research designs to the set of research designs traditionally employed by political scientists. Moreover, it suggests how a sequential use of quantitative and qualitative methods can be useful to analyse both, the effects of accountability mechanisms as well as the causal mechanisms explaining its evolution. In a final step, the paper critically discusses the extent to which the (potential) identification of the most realistic theory can advance our knowledge on the potentials and constraints to institutional engineering and its relevance to normative political theory.