Individual Background and Amendment Activity in the European Parliament Committee System

Amendments offer Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) a valuable tool to make important changes to the content of legislation, prior to its passage at the plenary stage. Notably, the right to table amendments at the committee stage is one of the last prerogatives available to individual legislators. Neither has it been monopolized by the otherwise ubiquitous party groups (EPGs), nor is it restricted to full members on a committee. However, given that the European Parliament (EP) also provides for a number of other players to weigh in on committee work—such as (shadow) rapporteurs or group coordinators—the determinants of tabling amendments have received comparatively less scholarly attention. In this paper, we address both individual and institutional determinants of amendment sponsorship at the committee level. Applying theories of legislative organization, we assess the extent to which MEPs with externally driven preferences, such as those with ties to interest groups or with particular expertise in the subject matter of the committees on which they serve, are more active participants in the amendment process prior to the adoption of a draft report or opinion. Using novel data from the first half of the 8th legislative term, our findings complement and expand upon recent work on the more institutional determinants of amendment (co-)sponsorship in the EP’s powerful committee system.