Blue Helmets and Black Robes: Cooperation Between Peacekeepers and International Criminal Tribunals

International criminal tribunals (ICTs), like the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Yugoslavia Tribunal (ICTY) are reliant on state cooperation for their success. However, both target states and third-party states have frequently been unwilling or unable to assist ICTs in their investigations and the arrest of the individuals they indict. This is why ICTs have explored requesting assistance from non-traditional actors, such as bounty hunters, NGOs and, in particular, peacekeeping forces. The cooperation with this latter group has largely been overlooked in the literature, even though it has seen both remarkable success and failure. For example, UN peacekeepers in the Congo provided security and a large amount of evidence to ICC investigators but then did nothing to execute the arrest warrant against warlord Bosco Ntaganda. One reason for this is that peacekeepers face various challenges when requested to assist ICTs. Not only does assistance have a potential negative impact on their impartiality, but their traditional emphasis on stability introduces important peace and justice dilemmas. Therefore, I seek to answer the question: Under which conditions do peace operations assist international criminal tribunals? I build on the scholarly literature on cooperation by third-party states to ICTs and social constructivist theorizing on peace operations to develop a theory that hypothesizes a number of conditions under which peace operations might assist ICTs. I will then test the theory by tracing the process through which the UN peace operation in the Congo response to several requests of the ICC for assistance. Not only will this paper contribute to filling a gap in the literature, it will also enhance our understanding of the potential dilemmas that peacekeepers face when being asked to help in implementing transitional justice efforts. In addition, it allows us to observe how various actors contest and interpret the anti-impunity norm in concrete, on-the-ground situations.