Instrumental or Symbolic? The Role of Multilateral Economics Sanctions

This article studies cooperation on multilateral economic sanctions. Despite low effectiveness and sanction-busting, multilateral economic sanctions are an increasingly popular tool of foreign policy. We explore two mechanism for cooperation on economic sanctions. First, instrumental, indicates that states face a collective action problem when coordinating multilateral coercion; we indicate that it can be solved through repeated interactions and reputation. Second mechanism, symbolic, relates to the domestic-audience benefit from multilateral sanctions; underscoring that the effectiveness of the sanction is irrelevant. We develop the two frameworks with the use of game theory and formal modelling and empirically test with the TIES data set. Our results provide support for the instrumental mechanism theory. Reputation on observance of multilateral economic sanctions and years spent at an international organisation, that coordinates the sanction regime, are key predictors for probability of multilateral sanctions. Paradoxically, international organisation, designed to bring peace, stimulate cooperation on coercive foreign policy.