Populists in Power: Populist Anti-Establishment Parties in Government

In recent years, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis, European Union (EU) member states have seen a huge increase in anti-establishment parties’ (AEPs) vote shares and governmental presence. No party family has increased its importance, both in the political arena and in academia more rapidly than populist AEPs. While populist AEPs had entered government before the financial crisis (such as the Freedom Party of Austria following the 1999 election), the number of populist AEPs entering government has reached new heights. However, despite increased attention being given to populist parties in academia, some questions remain open. What issues do populist AEPs compete on in the political arena? Are there any necessary conditions for populist AEPs to enter government? What explains the decision for populist AEPs to enter coalition government? These questions are increasingly important as populist AEPs are currently in government (either as major or minor partners) in several EU member states such as Austria, Hungary, Greece, Italy and Poland. The patterns of governance of populist AEPs varies widely across the EU. Fidesz has won consecutive supermajorities, coalitions between populist AEPs emerged in Greece (2015) and Italy (2018) and containing a populist AEP in Austria (2018). In some instances, populist AEPs provide parliamentary support to minority governments (Denmark and Netherlands). These examples highlight the power that populist AEPs wield is widespread and diverse across Europe. Such variation invites the above questions, which this paper seeks to answer. In short, increased electoral success opens up new opportunities for populist AEPs to enter government. While they may vary on the basis of left-right ideology, populist AEPs converge by having an increased focus on immigration, multiculturalism and/or austerity in addition to Euroscepticism to provide a potent platform when combined with populism. Populist AEPs, like all other parties, face pressures with increased vote shares and once given coalition potential, should take office; parties compete in elections to win office and/or to pursue specific policies. Populist AEPs are no different to established parties in this regard, in this paper it is argued that populist AEPs are policy-seeking and, as such, push the issues that propelled them to increased electoral success. Increased vote shares, leading to greater coalition potential, inevitably leads to a higher likelihood of entering government. However, populist AEPs face additional pressure as a consequence of their own behaviour; reliance on issue salience and issue ownership. Typically, populist AEPs may enter a coalition on the basis of shared ideology and issue emphasis. This has made for interesting partnerships in the case of Greece and Italy. Ultimately, this paper seeks to give theoretical and empirical evidence that populist AEPs compete on similar issues, heaving emphasis on to immigration (or multiculturalism) and/or anti-austerity issues. Financial crisis and the politicisation of previously ignored issues give populist AEPs an opportunity to reach increased success. As a consequence of their issue ownership and heightened issue salience, populist AEPs are more likely to enter government.