A Comparison Masqueraded as Causality: Examining Small States’ Influence in Intergovernmental Organisations

The paper disputes a deeply entrenched claim in the small state studies suggesting that small states can influence the decision making in intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) according to their national interests and explains why decisions made in IGOs’ are indeed often favourable to their smallest members. In doing so, the paper hopes to contribute to the small state studies by advancing our understanding of the interplay between the small states and IGOs and encourage a critical re-examination of the established assertion of small states’ influence on IGOs` decisions. The paper proceeds in three steps. At first, it scrutinises the notion of small state influence and exposes its shortcomings. Most importantly, it shows that the scientific literature written over the past three decades mostly – and sometimes even purposefully – confuse IGOs’ decisions that correspond to the national interests of small states with the ones that are results primarily determined by their efforts. Such confusion masquerades a simple comparison (congruence between small states interests and IGOs decisions) as causality (influence exerted by a small state) and then leads scholars to wrongly assume that the least capable member can advance its interests at the expense of other, more capable actors. Such criticism would not be productive, however, if one does not attempt to explain why in many instances IGOs’ do reflect the priorities of small states. Building on the theoretical arguments developed by Keohane (1984), the paper sets out to explain this paradox by assuming that systemic pressures surrounding IGOs and interests of the most powerful member-states are the strongest causal forces shaping the content of their decisions. If one accepts such an assumption, then IGOs decision should logically correspond to the national interests of their small member states when the following circumstances manifest themselves. First, small states’ interests in an IGO are somewhat compatible with the respective interests of the most powerful countries. Second, their interests are in concurrence with the systemic pressures that an IGO is facing. Hence, IGOs’ decisions might be in line with small states’ national interests not because of their influence but due to the accumulation of favourable circumstances that do most of the causal work and trick the scholars of believing that it is the small states which somehow manage to shape IGOs decisions to their advantage. In the end, the paper tests this argument by analysing the Baltic States’ attempts to facilitate the development of Common Energy Policy in the EU and to establish and then strengthen energy security framework in NATO. Even though the decisions made by these organisations mostly correspond with the expectations of the Baltic States, the study shows that their efforts had only a marginal significance in the decision-making process as the decisions were determined by the most influential member-states and specific systemic pressures.