A Joint-Sovereignty Trap? The Rise of EU Agencies with Operational Capacities

Authors: Christian Freudlsperger, Adina Maricut-Akbik, and Marta Migliorati This paper problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational capacities as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, we propose the term ‘joint sovereignty’ as a broader category that additionally involves the creation of joint implementation capacities in areas considered the hallmark of sovereign statehood, such as border management or law enforcement. The institutional choice for joint sovereignty is motivated by national preferences to pursue further integration in areas of core state powers without fully empowering supranational institutions in such fields. At the implementation stage, however, the exercise of joint sovereignty poses specific challenges. In an analogy to Scharpf, we argue that the institutional choice for joint sovereignty creates a systemic ‘trap’ that undermines the ability of both national and supranational actors to implement policies effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the mechanics of the trap with two case studies capturing the implementation challenges faced by EU agencies with operational capacities in the sovereignty-sensitive fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol). In exploring the practical consequences of sharing sovereignty in the EU, we contribute to the literatures on EU ‘agencification’, core state power integration, and deficiencies of multi-level policy implementation.