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Implications of Rule Change on the Reorganisation of Corporatism Within Multi-Level (Socio-)economic Governance

Political Leadership
Social Policy
Agenda-Setting
Decision Making
Europeanisation through Law
Policy Change
Policy-Making
Bernhard Zeilinger
University of Applied Sciences BFI Vienna
Bernhard Zeilinger
University of Applied Sciences BFI Vienna

Abstract

The European Semester has become the focal point for reform discussions in Europe along the policy cycle and evokes prioritized policy decisions. First, the European Commission (EC) takes on the role of policy guidance throughout the policy review to agenda-setting process especially for the eurozone. Second, clear benchmarks and scoreboards increase the technocratic capture potential at problem identification and interpretation. Third, it is the disciplinary approach of the so-called corrective arm of the procedure, which limits the scope of action in the national policymaking. As a consequence of the vertical notion of the European Semester, the parliament and social partners (SP) face a degradation in the course of the Semester procedure. However, the compliance with supranational policy objectives and the implementation of Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) are very low and does not speak for an efficient and effective regime. Anyhow, the impact of the European Semester is more of a discursive notion, by increasing supranational policy entrepreneurship. This article is designed around the question about the motives behind EC´s attempt to strengthen the involvement of SP as well as what kind of corporatism is in the being. The analysis, thus, starts twofold: First of all, the paper sheds light on how the new governance structure alter the scope for economic and social policy actors and lead to an inter- and intra-institutional shift of competences in agenda setting and policymaking at the supranational and national level. That matters in that it has consequences on previous forms of access by SP as well-approved channels might have lost its impact on the. Thus, SP have to adapt and develop new ways to ensure influence on the outcome. Second, from a neo-functionalist perspective, it is in the inherent interest of the EC to involve SP at the supranational level and to establish strong neo-corporatist structures because it legitimizes supranational economic governance as well as its position as a policy entrepreneur in the areas of labour market and social policy.