Pandemics and the Securitization of Health

The May 15th announcement by the Trump administration to create a public-private partnership known as ‘Operation Warp Speed’ to accelerate the development of COVID-19 countermeasures, prompts a very timely question: For the first time in history, are we now on the brink of a global scale securitization of health? Securitization is the process where an issue becomes framed as an existential threat to national interests, thereby making it legitimate to mobilize extraordinary measures. COVID-19, unlike any other health threat in modern history, has embodied the existential threat of pandemics. As much as COVID-19 is an impetus for health securitization, the way forward is unknown. Issues such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, Ebola, and even bioterrorism, while contributing to a growing acceptance that health issues can be intertwined with broader issues of national security, has nonetheless failed to elevate health to a global securitization agenda. Historically, securitization has been precipitated by shocks that have fundamentally altered the trajectory of a growing concern. For example, the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki Atomic Bombing, and the 1957 ‘Sputnik’ shock, spurred the creation of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Before the 1970s, energy security was not a prominent concern. The first oil shock in 1973, catapulted energy security to the global consciousness, which led to the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) , which also ushered national countermeasures such as the creation of the National Energy Act in the United States, which saw the creation of the strategic petroleum reserves. What would securitization mean for health? If history were to serve as a guide, with securitization, pandemic preparedness becomes a quasi-exclusive domain for states where considerations for health become secondary to considerations for security - in the economy, the society and perhaps even in the political order. The greatest impact is likely to be in relation to the production of commodities and inputs that are needed for pandemic preparedness. The markets for these commodities may not be left to laissez-faire mechanisms of private markets and instead may see heavy government intervention and control, via restrictions, subsidies and even state ownership. To reduce dependence on international markets, nations may even resort to setting up nationally controlled international supply networks. The threat nonetheless is global and requires cooperation towards the production of needed commodities. But that cooperation may perhaps be increasingly fragmented, due to the inherently inward economic and mercantilist focus necessitated by securitization. Commodities for non-pandemic diseases may benefit from the spillover effects of state investment. Increasing state ownership will also mean less reliance on joint international cooperation efforts.