“As Civilian as Possible, as Military as Necessary” – How Governments Evaluate Their Engagement in Afghanistan During and After the ISAF Mission.

The ISAF mission in Afghanistan has been a major challenge for most participating countries - not only in reference to material or personnel affairs but also strategically. The balancing act between a military operation and a development mission, between military and political aims and necessities, asked for new political instruments and military strategies such as the whole government approach. At the end of the ISAF mission, two big questions remain: first, what did the different countries achieve in Afghanistan and second, is there a common ground for future engagements? This paper asks how governments evaluate their engagement during and after the ISAF mission in detail. It looks at eleven countries, five European states (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom) and five abroad (Australia, Canada, USA, and New Zealand). Using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative content analyses of evaluation reports written by the governments, the paper compares the individual assessments in relation to four major aspects: a) how do governments measure the success of the ISAF mission, b) which mistakes and errors have been made, c) which explanations are used for success and failure and d) what lessons have been learned. The findings show that in spite of the individual priorities that the countries had there is a common understanding of what each country achieved and even at some level in regard to the reasons for success and failure. However, there are huge differences in the details: some countries are more self-critical and point to the lessons learned, others highlight the work that still needs to be done by others, e.g. the Afghan government.