Joint Bodies in International Agreements of the European Union: Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Delegation

In this paper, we are looking at an institutional phenomenon with a potentially huge impact on the EU’s ability to shape global governance that is almost entirely overlooked in the literature thus far. About half of the European Union’s (EU) international agreements provide for joint bodies (JBs) such as association councils and joint committees. These are common institutional frameworks that bring together representatives from the EU (Commission and/or Council) and the third country to oversee agreement implementation. Beyond the ability to discuss common problems and issue recommendations, they are sometimes empowered to amend the agreement or adopt binding decisions, which raises concerns about their democratic legitimacy. Moreover, they can be used to coordinate positions in multilateral fora such as international organizations. Although the number of JBs runs into the hundreds and their decision-making powers attract increasing attention, our knowledge about them is limited. We draw on principal–agent theory to explain the creation and the design of these bodies. Our argument highlights that states weigh the benefits of delegation, primarily reduced transactions costs and greater flexibility, against its costs, primarily in the form of agency losses. We argue that the size of losses is determined by whether agreements are concluded in an area where unanimity is required among member states in the Council and the number of third countries. In terms of third-country characteristics, we theorize that size affects agency costs. We test these expectations on an original dataset mapping JBs across more than 500 international agreements concluded by the EU since 1992. Our expectations are supported in a logit model with a dichotomous dependent variable on the presence or absence of JBs, while in an OLS regression with JB strength as the dependent variable only the policy area seems to play a role.