Allocation of Portfolios to Individual Ministers: Who Gets What and Why?

In coalition governments, the government formation process ends when party leaders allocate the portfolios their party received to the individual ministers. This phase is consequential for politics and policy because individual ministers have significant agenda-setting power. Nevertheless, for the most part, research on coalition bargaining focuses on the allocation of portfolios among parties, and research on ministerial selection rarely pays attention to the specific portfolios each minster receives. This paper aims at narrowing this gap by suggesting a framework for understanding the allocation of portfolios among cabinet ministers. The suggested framework is based on three components: 1. The level of autonomy the party leader has in selecting ministers in general and for specific portfolios. 2. The characteristics of the candidates 3. The relative saliency of the portfolios. The paper argues that when the party leader is autonomous, he/she will select ministers based on their competency for the position. Specifically, the most salient portfolios will be allocated to those candidates the leader believes to be the most appropriate based on their skills, expertise and ideological preferences. When the party leader is less autonomous the portfolios will be allocated based on the candidates’ political power, such that the most salient portfolios will be given to the most powerful candidates. In addition, regardless of the party leader’s autonomy specific portfolios are traditionally the prerogative of the prime minister to allocate to whoever he/she wishes. The paper examines the suggested framework using the case of Israeli cabinet ministers 1977-2019.