Explaining Institutional Successions: Contested Multilateralism and Re-Equilibration of Institutional Power

My paper seeks to explain ‘institutional succession’, i.e. cases where states dissolve an existing international institution and replace it with a new institution with a similar mandate and function(s). From the perspective of extant theories of international cooperation, institutional successions present a puzzle. A wide literature in IR asserts that - given the substantial costs and uncertainties entailed in negotiating international agreements - states will choose to reform existing institutions to meet new challenges, rather than accept the costs and risks involved in creating new ones. Nonetheless, examples of institutional succession abound. Why, given these functional reasons, do states frequently substitute new cooperative frameworks for existing ones? When and under what conditions is an existing institution most likely to be replaced? My paper presents a theoretical model based on levels of dissatisfaction with institutional status quo, reform costs, and the availability of credible outside options. I test my argument using statistical analysis and historical case studies of the supercession of the International Sugar Council by the International Sugar Organization (1967), the succession from the GATT to the WTO (1995) and the replacement of The International Wine and Wine Office (1924) by the International Organization of Vine & Wine in 2001.