Conspiracy Theories and Rational Critique

On the one hand, conspiracy theorists are regarded as at least prima facie irrational. On the other hand, the structure of conspiracy theories makes it notoriously difficult to criticise them by appeal to standard criteria of theory choice, such as internal and external coherence, explanatory force, and simplicity (e.g. Coady 2007, Hepfer 2015, Keeley 2007). Indeed, the problem with conspiracy theories seems to be that they comply with these standards too well. It is hard criticise an approach to belief-formation for being too critical and conscientious. I want to argue that a certain Kantian picture of reason enables us to criticise conspiracy theories as less than rational after all. In this picture, rational critique always involves self-critique. It is rooted in the idea that the verdicts of reason are not self-evident axioms but require vindication (O’Neill 1989, 2015). If reason does not admit of critical vindication, it will undermine itself. After all, reason is the faculty of criticism. That is, it is supposed to help us emerge from “self-incurred minority”, by judging for ourselves instead of accepting the verdicts of unchecked authorities (WE 8:35). Therefore, if the fundamental standards of that faculty remain unexamined, the enterprise of critical philosophy—and, thus, of enlightenment—is doomed to fail. Instead of casting off the “yoke of minority” (WE 8: 35), reason would be just another unchecked authority (O’Neill 2015: 3-4). In the Kantian picture, then, to advance a rational critique of something means always at the same time to criticise oneself. For conspiracy theorists, this would entail (i) questioning whether there is positive reason to believe in their hypotheses (instead of referring to a coherent network of auxiliary assumptions) and (ii) taking seriously the perspectives of others (instead of disregarding them as either ignorant ‘sheeple’ or as malignant minions). REFERENCES Coady, David. 2007. “Are Conspiracy Theorists Irrational?” Episteme 4(2): 193-204. Hepfer, Karl. 2015. Verschwörungstheorien: Eine Philosophische Kritik der Unvernunft. Bielefeld: Transcript. Keeley, Brian. 2007. “God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory.” Episteme 4(2): 135-149. Kant, Immanuel. 1996. Practical Philosophy, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Mary Gregor (ed. and trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. O’Neill, Onora. 1989. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. — 2015. Constructing Authorities: Reason, Politics and Interpretation in Kant’s Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.