Understanding the Internal Drivers of Contestation: EU Member States Between Divergence and Disengagement

EU foreign policy has always been dependent on EU member states ́ support. Since the introduction of the CFSP, there have been numerous instances where member states could not agree on a joint position. For the past two years, however, the contestation within the EU foreign policy system is said to have reached a new high. For example, the PSC's failure to agree on Arab League conclusions, on a joint statement on Venezuela, or an EU statement on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty on 4th February 2019 led Politico ́s Brussels Playbook to label it ‘Black Monday’, declaring that it ‘could go down [...] as the day a fatal blow was dealt to the EU’s attempts to be taken seriously on a global stage’. This is puzzling given the always political nature of CFSP decisions, the increased institutionalization of EU support structures (e.g. High Representative, EEAS), especially with the Treaty of Lisbon, and the level of socialisation in the Council's structures (Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Michalski and Danielson, 2019). This paper scrutinizes how the EU foreign policy cooperation system comes to terms with increased politicization and contestation from EU member states. Is it that we see more politicized foreign policy dossiers discussed in the Council or is there an increasing divergence of EU member states interests due to national politicization or populism? We contend that the majority of contestation research focuses on the impact of politicization on the formulation of EU foreign policy, but ignores the bigger challenge to EU foreign policy cooperation: member states disengaging in the implementation of CFSP decisions.