Information Disorder: A Kantian Moral Perspective

In a recent report published by the Council of Europe (Warlde and Derakhshan 2017), “Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making”, the authors attempt to “provide a framework for policy-makers, legislators, researchers, technologists and practitioners working on challenges related to mis-, dis-, and mal-information”. (Wardle and Derakhshan 2017: 10) ‘Information disorder’ refers to these three types of information, which, when disseminated, can be said to lead to information pollution. The report draws on social and psychological theories, particularly related to communication, in order to make sense of why certain types of information disorder are widely consumed and shared. The report, however, is missing a moral, normative perspective, and the aim of this paper is to provide a Kantian account of mis, dis- and malinformation, and to examine them ethically. Some of the conclusions of this discussion will clarify and complement particular aspects of the report, which, without the moral perspective, may seem puzzling. The first part of the paper briefly presents the framework of information disorder. Drawing on a previous study (Baiasu 2020), the second part constructs a Kantian account of dis-, mis- and malinformation and claims that Kant had the conceptual resources necessary for a thorough examination of this threefold distinction. In the final part, I discuss some of the ethical implications of the Kantian perspective and how it can clarify and complement aspects of Wardle’s and Derakhshan’s ambitious report. References Baiasu, S. (2020) “Sincerity in Politics: How Much Is Too Much?”, in S. Baume, V. Boillet and V. Martenet (eds) Disinformation in Referenda. London: Routledge. Forthcoming. Wardle, C. and Derakhshan, H. (2017) “Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for research and Policy Making”. Council of Europe Report DGI(2017)09. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.