German Power in the EU After Brexit Between Domestic Constraints and External Challenges: A Two-Level Analysis

January 31st 2020 marked an unprecedented historic event for the European Union as it faced the departure of the United Kingdom. Brexit not only reduces the EU’s membership base to 27 countries, most of all it also marks a significant shift in the EU’s internal power constellation. The UK never lived up to its economic and political potential in the European Community and later in the EU by restricting itself to the role of a predominantly reactive ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1998). Particularly during the past decade British influence on the EU’s political agenda significantly waned as a result of the lack of engagement and the increasingly inward-looking focus of successive Conservative governments. The UK consequently failed to fulfill the ambition to move to the ‘very heart of Europe’ (John Major) and to exercise a ‘leading role’ alongside Germany and France (Tony Blair). The UK’s clout nevertheless became noticeable in the EU’s overall political agenda and strategic direction. Since the onset of the global financial crisis and the subsequent eurozone crisis, the lack of British engagement and the waning economic standing of France has pushed Germany into the position of the EU’s ‘reluctant hegemon’ (Paterson 2011). The semi-hegemonial status reflected Germany’s solid economic standing and its substantial power resources (Bulmer and Paterson 2011). The ‘paradox of German power’ (Kundani, 2015) nevertheless contradicted the post-war tradition of reflexive multilateralism in German European policy, which at least partly explains chancellor Merkel’s hesitant leadership style. This paper critically examines the potential for Germany to maintain its semi-hegemonial status in the EU’s post-Brexit environment by adopting a liberal intergovernmental angle of analysis between domestic preference formation and scope for cooperation with other EU member states. The paper challenges the view that the British withdrawal from the EU will almost by default strengthen Germany’s grip on the EU’s strategic political and economic agenda. To adopt this view would neglect the fundamental domestic and external challenges to Germany’s power in the EU. Domestically the long-standing European policy consensus is under threat from the insurgent right-wing eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland, which has managed to build solid foundations of political support in Eastern Germany, as well as from Germany’s recent weak economic performance. On the level of intergovernmental EU diplomacy, Germany has failed to maintain alliances with its closest partners in Paris and in Central-Eastern Europe. Both France and Poland have hence turned increasingly sceptical towards Germany’s leadership. French president Macron is getting impatient with what he regards as the lack of German engagement with French proposals on the future shape of the EU. The nationalist Polish PiS government in Warsaw fundamentally disagrees with Germany over its approach to the migration challenge and its insistence on abiding by the EU’s democratic values. The paper outlines the background to these developments and offers potential solutions to enable Berlin to move the EU towards a more inclusive leadership agenda, which effectively addresses the EU’s profound political and economic challenges.