Europe's Capacity to Act in the Indo-Pacific

The election of Donald Trump as U.S. President bolstered Europe’s efforts to take on a more autonomous role in global affairs. Among others, this is pertinent to the Indo-Pacific to which Europe maintains strong economic ties based on growing mutual trade relations. However, this region is seething with potential for violent conflict exemplified by hosting five of the world’s largest arms recipient (India, South Korea, Pakistan, China, and Singapore). This poses a serious challenge to the rules-based order championed by the EU. We, therefore, try to answer the following question: What are the EU’s capacities to act in the Indo-Pacific? We believe that the EU ought to formulate a coherent arms export policy to the region to pursue a strategy of Offshore Balancing. As a first step towards this strategy, it will prove crucial to formulate a strategic industrial policy. So far, EU member states have been providing defence equipment to almost all of the countries of the Indo-Pacific and, thereby, undermining each other’s interests in the region. This showcases a serious lack of coordination, which the new Commission needs to tackle to strengthen the EU’s capacities to act in the Indo-Pacific according to the guideline of principled pragmatism stated in the EU Global Strategy of 2016. Concerning European arms exports to the region, principled pragmatism means that EU member states should take on a more selective approach. For example, prioritizing Asian democracies or formulating arms export criteria based on common values would be part of a strategic and coherent EU security policy towards the region. The EU certainly has capacities to act in the Indo-Pacific and coherence is the key to unlocking these capacities. In general, this strategic shift will build greatly on the EU’s capacity as a strong regulatory power, and setting a precedent with great impact for the region.