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Adapting Alliance to Post-Crimean World: the Case of Force Integration Units

International Relations
NATO
Security
War
Deividas Slekys
Vilnius University
Deividas Slekys
Vilnius University

Abstract

Events of 2014 in Ukraine changed regional security configuration. Russia’s actions forced NATO look for new ways and adapt to tackle increasing threat to its Eastern flank. After Wales’s summit one specific institutional change followed – creation of NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU). Russian aggression in Ukraine was a critical juncture, which forced NATO and member states to revise institutional framework and adapt to circumstances. Creation of NFIU’s was one of such changes. In this paper the cases of Baltic states would be discussed. These units were the first military oriented (strengthening deterrence and warfighting capabilities) NATO institutions in the Baltics. In all three Baltic states NATO was already operating centres of Excellence (cyber, energy and strategic communication), yet these institutions should be seen more like political/civilian structures, providing political advice for decision-makers. Therefore, NFIU’s, especially in the context of events in Ukraine, were perceived by the people as prove, that NATO is meeting its words with deeds and the commitment of allies is real. NATO and national defence communities had to improvise in order to integrate NFIU’s into existing military structures. From the start, this process was complicated, because of the double function. Primary function of these units is to facilitate deployment, assist in coordinating training and exercises of forces, and support defence planning. Yet, especially in the Baltic’s, NFIU’s play important role in information war and sometimes it is unclear, which one is more important. The importance of facilitating of warfighting capabilities in Lithuanian and Polish case got additional importance due to Suwalki corridor factor. The NFIU’s in both countries had more daunting logistical and planning challenges due to complexity of regions geopolitical situation and terrain. Also, because of Suwalki corridor’s importance for the whole NATO Eastern flank security the NFIU’s there got more attention from NATO’s political and military headquarters, which should lead to a deeper and faster institutional adaptation. Yet, at the same time, because these units were so symbolically important for the people in the Baltic states, their commanders and staff were asked/drawn into information war. They participated in variety of events ranging from conferences in Presidential palaces, business leaders’ forums to giving a lecture in small town public library or school class. They were asked and paraded through the countries to show and prove that NATO means business and it will come to help, when asked. However, it created specific challenges for national militaries and NATO HQ. NFIU’s were considered as more like TRADOC/Logistics units, commanded by colonel rank officer. Traditionally officers of such rank and units if such size are more concerned with tactical, routine implementation of military tasks. Yet in Baltic states case, they were forced to become strategic players, balancing between decision making and implementation.