Constitutionalization of International Law as Progress: Habermas Think with Kant Against Kant

Since Amy Allen published The End of Progress, the evaluation of ‘progress’ have been a hot topic in critical theory. According to Allen, the supposition of social progress cannot be easily sustained, because it is criticized to be based on Eurocentrism. Responding to such a postcolonial critique, critical theory must to be revised. According to this critique, Jürgen Habermas’s commitment to cosmopolitanism is also problematic. The constitutionalization of international law, which is his core idea in a international dimension, is based on progress as learning process. The problem is that he describes the history of international politics as the constitutionalization of international law, and it is understood as the result of learning process. He derives the principles and an orientation to the constitutionalization from the description and understanding of history, but these basis are criticized as distorted one, because he presupposes and privileges the history of Europa. In this point, apparently, his theory is Eurocentrism. I respond to this critique, focusing on the relationship between Habermas and Kant. Widely known, Habermas theorizes the constitutionalization of international law, modifying Kant’s idea of world republic. He conceptionalizes the third way between international union and world republic, distinguishing the liberal understanding of constitution from the republican one. In this paper, I focus especially on the idea of progress. Habermas uses the term “progress” in Kant’s sense. This means that progress has a direction, but is not always made in liner fashion, and progress is supported by practical intent committed to moral ideal. In this paper, first, I clarify the concept of progress as learning process in Habermas’s theory, and demonstrate that the progress means the process of gathering the reasons filtered out through the deliberations. Progress in Habermas is not Eurocentrism, because it is based on ‘horizontal’ learning process, in cooperation with innovative process of world disclosure, at least since the late 1980s. Therefore, he basically follows the logic of progress in Kant. Second, I consider more directly the relationship between Habermas and Kant. They has practical intents when they suppose progress in history. I consider how Habermas justifies the description of history based on such an intent, referring to Kant. Kant demonstrates that ideal is possible through particular descriptions of history, and by the descriptions he intends to promote the ideal. In this point, Habermas hold the same commitment. He modifies Kant’s conception of world republic itself, but on the basis of theorization they share same practical intent to promote the ideal.