The (de)mobilizing effects of corruption: the effects of perceived corruption and information on protesting in Brazil

No one disputes that corruption is detrimental to any democracy. That idea was easily extended to one way of measuring corruption – people’s perception. Contrarily, information was usually understood as a tool for improving democracy. The paper investigates the effects of corruption perception and information on one of democracy’s most important pillars – political participation. Using LAPOP’s secondary data, two measures of corruption perception are used, along with one information variable to test their effects on protesting in Brazil. If perceiving corruption means one thinks that corruption is the most serious problem the country faces, then corruption perception tends to mobilize the population, along with information. However, if perceived corruption is measured through whether someone believes the current government is not doing anything to curb corruption, then results are not straightforward. Running mediation, moderation, and interaction logit models, those who believe the government does not fight corruption tend to feel more informed, and the more perceived corruption is the more one protests. Surprisingly, those who see the government as inactive against corruption and, at the same time, feel they are informed, in an interaction model, demobilize. The mobilizing or demobilizing effect of corruption perception depends on how it is measured, whether located in the population or in the government and where the information effect takes place (side-by-side or multiplied by the corruption perception variable). Findings suggest people are not as apathetic as the literature suggests when perceiving corruption. Policies can channel the mobilizing power of corruption perception in order to reinforce accountability and improve the quality of democracy.