The Role of Desert in Distributive Justice

Desert-sensitive theories of distributive justice seem to be making a comeback, after what was generally regarded as a devastating critique in John Rawls’s extremely influential A Theory of Justice. (1973[1971/1999]) They are presented as having “a promising future” (Moriarty 2018: 153) and as likely to make significant contributions to debates on distributive justice “for some time to come”. (Ibid., 171) This unexpected success, however, will seem less surprising if we take into consideration the fact that Rawls’s critique of desert-sensitive theories was, in fact, less devastating than it initially seemed. What it questioned was the practicability of the notion, (Young 1992, Moriarty 2002) not, as some commentators suggested, the very notion of desert or its reality. (See Baiasu UM for a discussion of the debate.) Moreover, more recently it has been suggested that even the practicability problem could be addressed. (Moriarty 2005) This paper focuses on one aspect of the problem of practicability. The paper argues that, in virtue of an issue related to the epistemological argument against desert, a Rawlsian scepticism against desert persists. I think it is unlikely desert-sensitive theories will be able to respond to this scepticism satisfactorily. Yet, I claim that this should not be taken to imply that desert-sensitive theories should not be applied at all in our societies, but only that their application should be limited to certain distributive issues.