Relations not Boundaries : Reconceptualising Individual Autonomy Rights

The paper will reassess individual autonomy rights in light of recent work on relational conceptions of autonomy. Individual self-determination, or autonomy, has been a focus for liberal political theory (see e.g. Christman 1989; Christman and Anderson 2005). There is general agreement in the literature that the core meaning of individual autonomy is self-government, or self-direction. Beyond this core meaning, however, three broad interpretations of the concept of individual autonomy can be identified ‘procedural’, ‘substantive’, and ‘relational’ (e.g. Berofsky 1995; Christman 2015; Dworkin 1988; Forst 2005; Haworth 1986; Lindley 1986; Mackenzie and Soljar 2000; Mele 1995; Meyers 1989; Stoljar 2018). The first part of the paper will examine these three conceptions. In procedural conceptions of personal autonomy an action or decision is deemed autonomous if it is the result of an individual’s critical reflection and evaluation and is (or could be) endorsed by the individual because it follows or coheres with the individual’s own higher-order priorities (Bratman 2007;Dworkin 1988; Dworkin 1989; Ekstrom 1993; Frankfurt 1987; Frankfurt 1999). Proponents of substantive conceptions of autonomy have argued that purely procedural accounts of decision processes are incapable of distinguishing between truly autonomous and heteronomous decisions processes which appear autonomous. These may be the result of adaptive preference formation or of the internalisation of oppressive social norms. The concept of autonomy therefore requires substantive morally relevant content (Benson 1991; Christman 1991; Hill 1989, 2000; Korsgaard 1996; Wolf 1990). Proponents of a relational conception of autonomy have criticized both procedural and substantive conceptions - procedural accounts for being too individualistic and abstract because they neglect the specific social embeddedness and particular social relationships in the context of which real individuals make their decisions and act; and substantive accounts for being unduly prescriptive and universalist and in this way invalidating the decisions and actions of many real individuals as non-autonomous by definition (Christman 2004; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Meyers 1989, 2005; Narayan 2002; Nedelsky 1989; Meyers 1989, 2005). Proponents of a relational conception of autonomy argue instead that real persons are socially and historically embedded and that this forms an important aspect of the context for decisions and actions (weaker claim) or even of the content of decisions and actions themselves (stronger claim). The distinction between freedom as independence from other people’s choices and autonomy as the self-determination of choices has been a standard reference point in liberal political philosophy from Kant and Mill onwards. This has encouraged a territorial conceptualisation of individuals’ rights - one person’s right to autonomy ends where another’s begins – and the assumption that autonomous individuals are (relatively) self-contained entities. This assumption has been challenged in relational conceptions of autonomy. In the second part of the paper I will argue that this weakens the plausibility of the ‘contested boundaries’ account of individuals’ autonomy rights and that these rights should therefore be reconceptualised as a matter of (re)negotiating relationships between entities (individuals), a process which is likely to change the entities themselves and the meaning of individual autonomy.