Concept and Measures of Bureaucratic Nepotism: Evidence from the Mexican Judiciary

Bureaucratic nepotism —an undue preference for family members—undermines the merit-based systems for recruitment and promotion in public sector employment that are foundational for an effective, efficient, and legitimate public administration. Identifying the extent and depth of nepotism is crucial for launching public policies aiming to reduce corruption and enhance the quality of bureaucratic public service delivery, however it is difficult to identify and measure systematically. Existing empirical studies on nepotism struggle with the ambiguity of the concept and often fail to produce reliable and replicable measures. We contribute to understanding the link between the concept and the measures of bureaucratic nepotism from two angles. Conceptually, we unpack the nepotism definition into three components: a family tie, the preferential treatment to get a job or promotion, and the lack of qualification. We assess the operationalization of these components in three of the most common measures in the literature: matching surnames, declaration of family ties and perception surveys. We find that none of the measures alone meet the validity, reliability, and replicability criteria. Empirically, using original data, we provide an assessment of the three measures in the context of the Mexican judiciary, an institution long signalled for having this problem. We find that the three measures partially capture different aspects of the same underlying phenomenon. We discuss the pros and cons of each measurement and how they relate the concept to the empirical approach. This suggest that future empirical studies on nepotism should consider complementary perspectives to build a reliable and replicable measure as a starting point to explore its effects on the public administration performance.