Revolving door and access to policymakers. Does a logic of influence prevail?

The revolving door, or the hiring of former public officials by organized interest, is often associated with better access to policymakers. Specifically, political connections and process-oriented knowledge, often accumulated through professional experiences in the public sector, are seen as valuable access goods. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the relation between the revolving door and access in the context of the European Union: to what extent and under which conditions do revolving door practices facilitate access to the European Commission? The revolving door hypothesis is tested by combining two data sources: a dataset with publicly available records about the meetings between interest organisations and senior EC officials and evidence collected through the Comparative Interest Group-survey. We demonstrate that especially highly professionalized organizations, in which staff and organizational leadership dominate, benefit from the revolving. In contrast, the extent to which the membership decides on political positioning and advocacy strategies has no impact on access. These results show that revolving door practices are primarily connected with a logic of influence and therefore such practices are particularly advantageous for strongly professionalized organization. Groups driven by a logic of membership will profit much less from the revolving door when seeking access.