Methods of Public Political Philosophy

If everyday politics is characterised by rhetoric, and political philosophy by reason, what are the proper methods of argument for what might be called the art of ‘public political philosophy’? This is an important question, given that scholars are increasingly encouraged to practice this art, in the pursuit of ‘engagement’, ‘impact’, ‘relevance’, and so on, yet it is unclear exactly what it is they should be doing to achieve these things, and indeed if they should be attempting them at all, given various worries. For example, what if, in the pursuit of relevance, we overly simplify our arguments, or align them too quickly with the status quo? What if we target them at topics that are popular and straightforward at the expense of those that, ultimately, are both important and more complicated? And does it make a difference if we do this professionally, from the platform of our institutional affiliations, as opposed to personally, from the platform of our social media accounts? In this paper I suggest range of examples of good and bad public political philosophy, as well as a set of particular methods worth deploying, with suitable caution, as gleaned in part from those examples. This guidance should help to orientate scholars when encouraged or pressured to practise this art, but also hopefully enrich wider conversations in our subject around how and when we should engage with the ‘real world’, whether pursued under the banners of realism, non-ideal theory, ‘political’ political theory, or some other debate altogether.