Mapping the European administrative space EU Agencies‘ Formal Independence over Time

The position of independent EU agencies in the European administrative space is constantly changing. In the last decade, the EU responded to policy crises and implementation problems by creating more independent EU agencies with more competences. Recent examples for this are the creation of the ESAs to respond to the financial crisis and expanding Frontex’s tasks and resources as a reaction to the migration crisis. Moreover, European legislators replaced the founding regulation of more than half of all EU agencies to combat the often criticised disparate and idiosyncratic nature of EU agencies during the Juncker Commission. These institutional harmonization reforms influence EU agencies’ capacities but also their formal independence from other EU institutions to different degrees. Formal independence reflects legislators’ willingness to forgo influence and is an important yardstick for agencies’ de facto independence and decision-making behaviour. Thus, our paper raises the question how EU agencies’ independence as their raison d’être develops over time and why some EU agencies become more independent than others. Though some research exists on the formal independence of EU agencies, this research mostly focusses on single agencies or compares only some selected agencies. What is missing, is a systematic mapping of EU agencies’ independence in a cross-sectional as well as a longitudinal manner. To provide such a mapping, we compile a novel dataset that measures the formal independence of each EU agency. It covers the entire EU agencies’ landscape – with some of the most powerful agencies only created in recent years. However, it also tracks the development of formal independence over time through including amendments and regulatory overhauls. In addition to this mapping, we tentatively explore some potential explanations for variance in agencies’ independence. To do so, we employ both systemic and agency-level hypotheses. For instance, isomorphism or the rational learning of political principals might propel the formal independence of all EU agencies towards a more uniform governance model. On the other hand, agency-level factors such as an agency’s competences or its regulated sector might be more influential in forging its formal independence over time, creating distinct governance models. Thereby, we unravel the drivers of stability and change in EU agencies’ formal independence. This mapping of formal independence in the European administrative space, moreover, allows us to both update our explanations of competence delegations to EU agencies and create insights in the interaction of the formal politics of institutional choice and functional pressures in the post-delegation phase.