The making and maintenance of extended nuclear deterrence: A critical discursive approach to a security policy

The US’ extended nuclear deterrence (END) is widely regarded as an effective security policy for the protection of NATO members. This perception of effectiveness necessitates the assumption that END is effective at deterring military challengers. However, this view is largely based on assumptions based on nuclear weapons’ material properties and (socio-) psychological elements, e.g., the credibility of a threat. Extant research indicates that both aspects do not provide sufficient reasons for supporting the effectiveness of END. This leads to the following research question: In what ways were the proponents of END able to establish this concept as a central security policy of NATO despite a lack of evidence for its effectiveness? This study argues that the existence of END is mainly based on the discursive construction of its meaning as an effective deterrent threat and the necessity of providing such a threat. These meanings are created by authorized speakers using discursive strategies, e.g., by presenting this effectiveness as common sense, thereby delegitimizing and muting counter-discourses. By approaching the discourses on END via Critical Discourse Analysis, this study aims to show how decision-makers can function as agents of stability in discourses by focusing on times of the establishment and contestation of END. Such times of contestation are often based on significant changes in the political and ideological context (e.g., the beginning and the end of the Cold War). Understanding the stabilizing role of authorized speakers against contesting discourses is of particular interest in times of rising counterdiscourses challenging the further existence of END. Analyzing texts – orally and written – produced and disseminated by authorized speakers to construct and stabilize the meaning END allows for a critical approach to understanding the establishment and defense of a security policy against contestation. This study expects to identify discursive strategies to better understand the establishment and maintenance of END, and the strategies used by decision-makers to establish and maintain security policies in general. Finally, the findings are likely to have implications for policymakers regarding the maintenance of existing and establishing of new END cooperation.