From Electoral Pledges to Coalition Agreements: Coalition bargaining and policy payoffs in Germany (2002-2021)

Policy negotiations to form a government coalition implies to abandon some of the pledges made to voters. Yet, we know surprisingly little about the conditions under which parties succeed in pushing their pledges into the coalition agreement, the types of promises that have more chances to make it, and the implications for mandate representation. Based on original longitudinal data on the inclusion of German governing parties’ electoral pledges in coalition agreements over two decades (N=6,300), we reveal that parties bargain within the latitude defined by coalition conflict and party size to advocate the pledges they care most about. Coalition negotiations filter out conflictual electoral pledges, including those made by the largest parties and the most substantive ones. Coalition agreements therefore reflect a lowest common denominator rather than a package deal aggregating coalition partners’ respective policy proposals. This has significant implications with regard to policymaking under coalition governments and mandate representation.