Path dependence and collective action problems in international technology regulation

Technology is central to virtually all contemporary issues of international cooperation yet there is no general theoretical framework for assessing its distinct characteristics as an object of international regulation from a vantage point of rationalist cooperation theory. Integrating concepts from historical institutionalism and transition theory, I propose that technology possesses distinct features that combine to make international regulatory responses inefficient. During technological emergence, strong uncertainty as well as asymmetry in the global distribution of underpinning capacities create collective action problems that are challenging or impossible to overcome. Over time, uncertainty and asymmetry attenuate and thus reduce the severity of the collective action problem. In parallel, however, technologies become increasingly integrated into wider socio-technical systems characterized by path dependence, leading to compounding losses in regulatory leverage over time. Thus, as the collective action problem improves, path dependence ramps up. As a consequence, international technology regulation is systematically inefficient in terms of capturing technological benefits and reducing associated costs. This pattern is bound to exhibit strong empirical variation across issue areas but implies a limited scope for adequate international solutions to key challenges in contemporary world politics. I use the cases of nuclear energy and novel biocontrol agents for illustrating the explanatory power of this theoretical framework.