Combating misinformation online: political irrationality as a feasibility constraint

It is sometimes suggested that governments ought to play a more active role in combating social media misinformation and related evils (fake news, disinformation, “malinformation” etc.). I argue that many such proposals run up against feasibility constraints. Combating misinformation frequently takes the form of posting corrective notices (“fact checks” etc.) alongside the offending content. However, it is doubtful whether such interventions are likely to achieve their goals. This is because people don’t process political information rationally (or so many political scientists believe). Since corrective notices are instances of politically relevant information (i.e., information relevant to the political beliefs of ordinary people), they are unlikely to be processed rationally, and so, such notices are unlikely to be effective. Empirical evidence on the efficacy of online fact checks bears this out. This is a major feasibility constraint that undermines the rationale for government’s involvement with misinformation on social media. On the other hand, alternative interventions, such as ex ante nudges to get people to be more rational, appear more efficacious. However, it seems, on the face of it, disrespectful to condition the participation in online political discourse on exposure to nudges; it also appears disrespectful to mandate that such nudges be deployed by social media companies. (Or so I will try to show). Finally, the implementation and assessment of these interventions is likely to be politically biased – and consequently, the ultimate decisionmakers are likely to implement and assess the success of such interventions in politically biased ways. It is thus not obvious that the resulting ecosystem for political discussion will be an improvement over the status quo on any metric that matters. Thus return feasibility constraints due to political irrationality.