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Hungarian revisionist narratives as a means of tension-building against Ukraine

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Ethnic Conflict
Extremism
International Relations
Security
War
Narratives
Karin Kőváry Sólymos
Masaryk University
Karin Kőváry Sólymos
Masaryk University

Abstract

In the Central and Eastern European region, revisionist claims are present in the agendas of far-right groups in almost every country. It is no different in Hungary, where statements about Greater Hungary are no longer just part of the vocabulary of underground nationalist groups. Since 2010, when Viktor Orbán's Fides came to power, he has been building up his agenda of "virtual reunifying" of Greater Hungary step by step. In doing so, it has become part of the public discourse and all the symbols of the topic. The territorial claims in these revisionist narratives also affect Ukraine, particularly Carpathia - including its 200 000 ethnic Hungarian minority. The Kremlin has long exploited these revisionist voices to weaken the region and extend its influence. Moreover, these narratives against Ukraine further intensified following Russia's aggression against the country. They are a convenient and effective means of fomenting conflict between the EU's regional member states and Ukraine. They aim to weaken European unity and undermine solidarity with Ukraine. The greatest promoters of this are the pro-Kremlin actors. This paper explores revisionist narratives in Hungarian public discourse that seek to dismantle Ukraine's territorial integrity, identifying the different framing of the issue. In the case of Hungary, the pro-Kremlin position and the revisionist narrative are mainly present on the far right. In their speeches, their representatives either demand the autonomy of Transcarpathia or its annexation to Hungary - using arguments from the Kremlin's vocabulary, such as that Ukraine cannot be considered a legitimate state. In both cases, they see military conflict on the country's territory as an opportunity. Therefore, the primary targets of the text are Hungarian far-right actors - movements and the far-right party Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland Movement), which entered the Hungarian parliament in 2022. I argue that revisionist demands, keeping the topic on the agenda, are always coupled with a solid pro-Russian and pro-Kremlin position. No less important is the position of the Hungarian government, which is crucial given the united EU position. Although supportive of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Hungarian government's position is contradictory in its communication, as the Hungarian government has considered the Kremlin's security demands legitimate since the beginning of the current Russian aggression against Ukraine. In practice, it believes Ukraine should give up part of its territory. Lastly, I illustrate where the Hungarian government and its representatives have contradictory communications and where the revisionist overtones of these communications are detectable. The core of the research is the analysis of official political and foreign policy documents (e.g., party programmatic), media outputs of the studied actors, or the analysis of social media activities in the first year of Russian aggression against Ukraine.