Politicians Fight Back: Unintended Consequences of Corruption Convictions for Judicial Independence (1946-2020)

This article examines the impact of corruption convictions of former heads of government on the independence and powers of the judicial branch. The standard accountability framework conceives the conviction of a former leader as a signal against the political elite's impunity. However, politicians who engaged in corruption in the past or present have little incentive to maintain the same legal instruments used against former leaders, as they can potentially be used to punish the malfeasance of those currently in office. We propose and test a backlash theory, which explains why such convictions can make the judiciary more vulnerable to political targeting by governing elites. To test our hypothesis, we compiled the Heads of Government Convicted of Crimes (HGCC) dataset, which includes details of all convictions received by former heads of government worldwide between 1946 and 2020. Our findings suggest that, on average, corruption convictions of former leaders reduce judicial independence and powers in the years following a conviction. We also examine the role of elite renewal and media independence in determining the scope conditions of this result. By shedding light on the circumstances in which the judicial branch is more susceptible to constraints by governing elites, these findings enhance our understanding of the connection between anti-corruption initiatives and autocratization processes. They also reveal the challenges of holding political elites accountable while protecting judicial independence.