Escaping Human Rights Pressure: How Governments Defend Human Rights Violations

Governments that violate human rights are often criticised and condemned for their abuse by the international human rights community. Prior studies have argued that such human rights pressure can induce the target government to reduce its violations. However, empirical evidence shows only mixed support for this proposition. One potential explanation for the ineffectiveness of shaming campaigns is that target governments with an interest in continuing human rights abuses adopt effective strategies to counteract such pressure. One strategy, that remains under-studied, is the target’s communicative defence. We simply lack systematic evidence about what governments say and do when they are criticised for their abuses. Therefore, this paper investigates what rhetorical strategies governments use to counter international criticism and thus why such pressure might be ineffective. Building on insights from securitisation theory, I argue that governments will try to construct human rights and international pressure as an existential threat, thereby undermining the pressure and justifying violations to their population. I present three distinct rhetorical strategies that governments may employ. First, the government can portray international pressure as undue interference in domestic affairs and as a threat against sovereignty. Second, the government can justify human rights abuses by arguing they are necessary to protect the security of the state. Last, the government can claim that human rights constitute a threat to national values and identities. Empirically, I test these arguments in a medium-N set-up with 20 diverse, most-different cases of international human rights pressure between 2001-2021. Through qualitative analysis of public statements and speeches by government officials, I examine whether the proposed strategies are indeed present across very different cases and contexts. Preliminary findings suggest that target governments – irrespective of time, place, regime type, and level of protests – do employ these strategies in an attempt to defend their abuses and undermine international pressure. The paper thus offers important new insights into one plausible explanation for why shaming campaigns only rarely prove effective.