Private Property and the Postulate of Public Right in Kant's Rechtslehre

In his „Doctrine of Right“ Kant formulates the postulate of public right, according to which it is duty to leave the state of nature and enter the civil state, i.e. to establish the latter together with others and remain in it. This duty, which is juridical, meaning that others are morally authorized to force me into entering the civil state and, if possible, vice versa, is a direct consequence of the right to private property (or the intelligible possession, in strict Kantian terms) over external objects of choice, which at least provisionally holds in the state of nature. As the property over external objects of choice is neither secure nor certain (i.e. it is ius controversum) in the state nature, one is obligated to enter the civil state, where it can be determined what is “Mine or Yours” and secured from the violence of others. However, in addition to the postulate Kant also asserts that if property over the external objects of choice in the state of nature was not, at least provisionally, rightful, there would be no duty to establish the civil state. This claim is not the same as the one of the postulate of public right. It is “stronger”, so to say, and means that we have the duty demanded by the postulate only because of the provisionally rightful property in the state of nature, and not because our life, bodily integrity or even physical possession are endangered in that state, which is the case as well. This paper aims to address Kant’s “stronger” claim about private property as a necessary precondition of our duty to enter the civil state. Interpretation of this claim, as I will try to show, crucially depends on taking into account the fact that Kant’s approach is metaphysical and not anthropological or pragmatic, or, in other words that he develops his Rechstlehre out of a priori principles of pure practical reason, and not out of empirical premisses or “observations” on human nature. My central argument is however that Kant distances himself from earlier natural law theory in one more important respect: namely he avoids the old problem of “deriving obligation from the fact” (e.g. self-preservation as simultaneously the natural human inclination and natural right), by establishing the transition to civil state as a genuine moral duty and not as a rule of prudence. For this, the “stronger” claim is essential. Meaning the authorisation to put others under obligation with respect to some external object, private property is the concept of pure practical reason, in contrast to life, human needs and desires, or even empirical possession. In the last part of the paper, I hope to show that the ultimate source of our duty to enter civil state is not the right to private property as such, but freedom as the only original and innate right. The former is nevertheless necessary for the realization of freedom in outer world and for constructing the realm of rights and duties regarding our external actions.