Joint operations of EU and national agencies

Effective policy implementation in the EU multilevel system is particularly difficult and riddled with potential dysfunctionalities. The ‘polycrisis’ of the past fifteen years has repeatedly highlighted the implementation deficits in the EU multilevel system. In reaction, the EU has increasingly relied on the ‘joint implementation’ model that requires the creation of novel institutional resources on the EU level. What unites these novel institutions for joint implementation is, first, their hybrid governance structure that incorporates both national and supranational governors (joint control) and, second, their ability to act alongside national administrators in the practical monitoring and enforcement of EU law on the ground (joint implementation). From a competence-control perspective, joint implementation thus formulates a novel approach, treading a middle ground between competence and control in the quest for a more effective system of multilevel implementation. At the same time, the model can produce various inefficiencies when dissatisfied principals seek to enhance their autonomous competence or control while being institutionally enmeshed in a compulsory system of joint implementation. While control-driven actors can block joint implementation, which leads to ineffective or non-implementation, competence-driven actors can shirk their collective responsibilities and engage in uncoordinated action, leading to responsibility-shifting or obstruction. The paper at hand explores the practical occurrence of these dysfunctionalities of joint implementation between EU agencies and national administrators, relying on qualitative interviews with practitioners from the European Union Asylum Agency (EUAA), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), and Europol.