The National Accord, Impunity and the Fragile Peace in Kenya

Kenya’s National Accord and Reconciliation process was signed two months after the highly contested December 2007 presidential elections. During this period, over 1300 people were killed and 300.000-600,000 displaced. Though the accord ended the short-term violence, it is less than clear that it will lead to peace. Instead, it put in place a Government of National Unity in which the political elite on both sides of the conflict shared a common interest in avoiding accountability for the atrocities committed. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence tried to leverage the threat of the International Criminal Court involvement to get the government to create a hybrid Kenyan/international tribunal based in Kenya, but ultimately failed to do so. As a result of the lack of credible domestic prosecutions, the ICC announced in December 2010 its intention to take action against six high-level suspects. Still, very few of the victims’ needs have been met – hundreds of thousands are still languishing in IDP camps – and provisions for witness protection are far from sufficient. As foreseen in the National Accord, the government did appoint a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, meant to contribute directly to peacebuilding. However, it sabotaged the commission’s effectiveness by saddling it with a controversial chairman and starving it of funds. New political polarizations, paired with the lack of provisions for the disarmament of militias and the country’s record of complete impunity (except for, at most, up to six “big fish), suggest that political violence is highly likely to re-emerge over the couple of years. In fact, there is no real tradeoff in Kenya between peace and justice, but rather a substantial lack of both.