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Rebellion against absolute power in democratic theory and democratic innovations

Democracy
Political Participation
Political Theory
Normative Theory
Markus Pausch
University of Applied Sciences Salzburg
Markus Pausch
University of Applied Sciences Salzburg

Abstract

The revolt against authoritarianism is the starting point of democracy (Camus 1997; Pausch 2019). It can be regarded as a primal moment of democracy against the absolute power of autocratic/authoritarian rule. This revolt often arises from an emotion, an immediate situation in which oppression or injustice is spontaneously questioned and fought against. But it can also be well thought out and planned, based on rational judgement. In any case, to be able to carry out such a revolt, the rebel him/herself needs a certain amount and certain forms of power. Rebels must be (cap)able to revolt, in the sense of the French word "pouvoir", i.e. have the skills and means to do so. In authoritarian regimes, they need courage above all, be it daring or the courage of despair which can also be seen as a form of power. They must therefore act with the aspects of power available to them, i.e. personal qualities such as courage, determination, strength, skills such as rhetoric, cleverness or material forms of power (like money, weapons, etc.). In established democracies and in the course of democratic innovations, as well as in the concept of democratic theorising (Asenbaum 2023), the idea of equal power as relative power versus absolute power is constitutive. Compared to authoritarian systems, democracy is characterised by the claim for the equal distribution of three dimensions of power, namely the dimension of being allowed, the dimension of being capable and the dimension of having resources to exercise power. In the sense of the idea of equally distributed power, all citizens only have relative power, but never absolute power. The latter would characterise an authoritarian government. Democracy is thus about the equal and fair distribution of power in its various dimensions. This means that every person must be enabled to develop competences, beginning with the power to defend oneself against coercion and oppression. Power here means that people are allowed to be as they want. In addition to being allowed to be, power plays a role as ability. And this ability requires a resource dimension: having power (on the basis of a function, a special knowledge, an in-formation advantage or economic means) (cf. French/Raven 1960). Based on these assumptions, the question arises as to whether and how relative power in its three dimensions is present in the idea of democratic innovations and in democratic theorising in particular, and what role the possibility of revolt plays here. The argument of this paper is that there is an insurmountable power imbalance in these processes, as initiators and facilitators usually have more power than participants. The power overhang is evident along the three dimensions of being allowed, being capable and having resources throughout the entire process of democratic innovation, from initiation to the formulation of results, diffusion and evaluation. This should not detract from the call for more democratic innovation and democratic theorising, but should raise awareness and promote improvements.