The importance of metaethics for the methodology of normative political theory: Defending metaethical plausibility and metaethical-methodological fit as desiderata on any methodology, theory or claim in normative political theory

This paper defends the importance of two desiderata for methodologies in normative political theory, and by implication, for any political normative theory or claim. Metaethical plausibility requires that theories or claims are coherent with a plausible metaethical theory. Metaethical-methodological fit requires that a normative theory or claim can be derived with a method suitable for investigating the normative as this is understood by a plausible metaethical theory. Together, the two desiderata amount to the requirement that normative theories should make sense all the way down. They are not all there is to justifying a method or a theory in normative political theory but are proposed as important desiderata on any such method or theory. Another way to put this is: why should political agents such as voters or decision makers take the claims of political philosophers seriously if political philosophers cannot show that they know what they are studying (metaethical plausibility) and how to do so (metaethical-methodological fit). The argument is made in the context of ‘political philosophy’s methodological moment’ (Floyd 2020) and growing discontent with the ‘standard post-Rawlsian way of doing political philosophy’ based on intuitions and reflective equilibrium. The paper gives three arguments for accepting these methodological desiderata. First, it is generally desirable to have a good understanding of the subject matter one is studying, and to have a sound methodology appropriate for the subject matter. Second, and often overlooked by political philosophers, metaethics and choice of methodology can make a significant difference at the level of first-order normative theory. For example, Utilitarianism and utilitarian calculus results in very different first-order claims from Kantianism or standard post-Rawlsian theorizing. Third, normative reasoning is always open to sceptical challenges, and anyone who wants to make normative claims to others should therefore have good responses to give to reasonable sceptics. An example are sceptics that press debunking arguments that what is presented as claims that are morally binding are really just bids that favour the powerful (Geuss 2010). Finally, the paper shows that there is no way for any theory to escape these desiderata, e.g. by avoiding committing to a metaethical or a moral theory. The desiderata can be applied to any existing approach in normative political theory, with real bite. It is argued that standard post-Rawlsian theorizing struggles with metaethical-methodological fit, and referring to an overlapping consensus to avoid having to engage with metaethics will not do, as the comprehensive doctrines that support such a consensus can assessed by the two desiderata, and moreover, it is implausible that such a consensus exists in the first place, given the state of politics and political philosophy. The paper then applies the desiderata to two recent alternative approaches: Normative behaviourism (Floyd 2017) and ideology critique centred political realism (Aytac and Rossi 2023). Despite the explicit disavowal of moral normativity of the latter, it cannot avoid relying on implicit metaethical or metanormative commitments, and the paper argues that both these theories will need extensive revision in response to the desideratum of metaethical-methodological fit.