The Importance of Plausible Foundations and Methodological Fit in Moral and Political Philosophy: Two Deficiencies of the Postrawlsian Approach

This paper examines the importance of two features typical of the dominant Postrawlsian approach to moral and political philosophy characterized by the method of reflective equilibrium based on normative intuitions or judgements. First, it is often pursued without a theory of normativity, i. e. a theory of the fundamental nature of normativity. Second, without a theory of normativity, we cannot assess whether its method is suitable for studying the normative, whereas assuming moral realism, we will find that it is not. I argue that each of these features amount to serious deficiencies that correspond to a failure to satisfy two desiderata: Plausible foundations and Good methodological fit. Satisfying these desiderata is important in its own right, necessary to avoid incoherence and respond to reasonable sceptical worries, and important because of the dependence of first-order theory on method and theory of normativity. Moreover, it is necessary to reach a wide reflective equilibrium. The upshot is a serious challenge to Postrawlsian moral and political philosophy, and the discovery of two important desiderata that should be applied to any approach to normative moral and political philosophy. First-order normative questions will have to be pursued together with questions about method and theory of normativity.