Religious reasons and democratic deliberation: A critique of secularistic approaches

Jürgen Habermas remarks in his recent writings that religion has an ambivalent political role: Of course, it can foster anti-democratic attitudes and violence, but it can also be a resource for solidarity and morally important insights. To fulfil this purpose, however, it must be able to be actively lived out in the public sphere. Yet, some political theorists assess this as normatively problematic: democratic will formation is about deliberating generally acceptable legal norms – an effort in which, at least in pluralistic societies, religious convictions must not play a role because they themselves will not be generally acceptable. At least, this is how it seems prima facie. In the first part of my talk, I would like to present such a secularistic position with reference to Robert Audi and at the same time argue that exclusivism is democratically not convincing. On the contrary, various possibilities can be cited against it as to how religious reason can democratically claim public significance, especially when it comes to strengthening or creating bounds of solidarity. In the second part of my paper, I would like to introduce a general criterion by which religiously reasoned claims can be tested for their democratic legitimacy following Habermas’ theory of communicative action.